Vulnerabilities in SSL & TLS :- Sweet32

7 Jan 2022, 10 a.m.
02:07 minutes

In this article, we will look at CVE Numbers CVE-2016–2183 and CVE-2016–6329, also known as the Sweet32 attack. The attack which involves collecting SSL traffic using legacy block ciphers via a person-in-the-middle context and subjecting it to a collision attack.

    Main Points

    • Sweet32 takes advantage of weaknesses in the design of some ciphers.
    • Allows an attacker to recover small portions of plaintext encrypted with 64-bit block ciphers (such as Triple-DES and Blowfish).
    • Based on the use of legacy block ciphers, which are vulnerable to a practical collision attack when used in CBC mode. A simple birthday attack can be used to identify 64-bit block cipher collisions when using the CBC mode of operation. When a collision occurs, it means that the input and output are the same, allowing the encrypted data to be exfiltrated.
    • The use of a 64-bit block ciphers is likely to produce a collision after 32 GB of data, but for a practical attack the researchers found that up to 785 GB of data is required.
    • A specific weakness in the OpenSSL implementation of SSLv2 allows for a ‘special DROWN attack,’ which greatly reduces the effort required to break the encryption, allowing for real-time person-in-the-middle attacks.

    Quick Reference

    Description

    The attack which involves collecting SSL traffic using legacy block ciphers via a person-in-the-middle context and subjecting it to a collision attack.

    Abbreviation

    SWEET32

    Name

    SWEET32

    CVE Number

    CVE-2016–2183 and CVE-2016–6329

    Type of Vulnerability

    The attack takes advantage of flaws in the design of some block ciphers.

    Affected

    Carrying out the TLS variant of the Sweet32 attack successfully requires a very specific set of capabilities on the part of the attacker:

    • The attacker must be able to run JavaScript in the victim’s browser to generate data for transmission to the server.
    • The attacker must keep the victim on the malicious JavaScript page for one to two days to generate enough ciphertext blocks to find a collision.

    Remediation

    Do not support or negotiate 3DES cipher-suites. At a minimum, AES should be preferred over 3DES. Limit the length of the TLS session.

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